mind

I have to write a paper refuting or agreeing with some frequent objections to the type identity theory of mind, functionalism, and physicalism in general. I figured I'd jot down some ideas even though the paper isn't due for a while.

The three arguments I have to discuss are the zombie argument, the inverted spectrum argument, and the mary's room thought experiment which I describe in a previous post. But before I go into detail over these objections I should first define the two most popular theories of mind: type identity theory and functionalism.

The type identity theory of the mind states that mental states exist and literally are brain states. Pain is pain only because my brain goes into the "pain" state. Every time I am burned, my brain acts up in a predictable manner. This means that I can be in pain without even touching a sharp needle or hot stove; as long as my brain is for some reason in the pain state. Pain, and any other mental state, is defined not by its function, but by what is going on physically in my brain and nothing else.

Functionalism on the other hand says that mental states exist and are defined only by their functional roles. So for example, the mental state of pain is defined by what causes it, and what it causes; not by what is going on in the brain at that time. Pain is only pain because it is caused by harmful external stimuli, and because it's function is to get us away from the harmful thing as soon as possible.

Both of these theories of mind have their benefits and downfalls. I will illustrate there shortcomings in my next post.